I examine the use of flexible savings-and-loan accounts offered by SafeSave, a microfinance institution serving poor slum dwellers in Dhaka, Bangladesh. I find that 59% of the clients co-hold, meaning that they borrow at high interest rates and simultaneously hold low-yield liquid savings. Co-holders could immediately pay down, on average, 32 per cent of their debt using liquid savings and thus avoid significant interest payments. The results show that co-holders are more likely to be regular workers subject to little income uncertainty, suggesting that co-holding is not a consequence of liquidity needs. The paper discusses alternative explanations. 
Introduction
Regardless of their wealth, most people co-hold debt and liquid savings (Gross & Souleles, 2002; Collins et al., 2009) . In other words, people simultaneously hold expensive revolving debt and lowyield liquid savings.
1 This behaviour seems irrational. Rational individuals would tend to use their liquid savings to repay their debt, either partially or totally. In developed countries, the need for liquidity can explain why rich 2 households borrow while simultaneously holding liquid deposits.
This article explores whether the liquidity rationale is also valid for poor populations in developing countries. Although the poor, like the rich, co-hold debt and liquid savings, my results suggest that the theory linking co-holding to liquidity needs does not hold for poor people. I reach this conclusion by exploiting a unique dataset released by SafeSave, a microfinance institution (MFI) operating in the slums of Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh. A full 59 per cent of SafeSave's 16,076
clients are co-holders.
In a perfect world without friction-no borrowing constraints, no behavioural friction, no uncertainty, no intergenerational transfers, perfect capital markets, and so on-individuals smooth consumption perfectly over their lifetime. In this world, individuals should either save or borrow, but not both. They borrow when their income is low and save when it is high. In real life, however, evidence documents that individuals borrow and save simultaneously. Rich people hold substantial savings in their fully liquid bank account and simultaneously revolve credit card debt (Gross & Souleles, 2002) . The poor hold liquid savings and simultaneously borrow from informal and formal sources (Collins et al., 2009; Morduch, 2010) . What is different in real life from the perfect frictionless world?
Among the rich, it is well documented that co-holding of substantial savings in bank accounts and credit card debt is due to liquidity needs. 3 The theory of liquidity needs-originally formulated by Telyukova and Wright (2008) and Zinman (2007) , and later extended by Fulford (2015a)- highlights that liquid deposits are valuable to households for transactions and precautionary 4 purposes. The reason is twofold. First, some expenses, such as rents, mortgages, utilities, and health-related costs, cannot be paid for by credit card. Second, households may find it risky to rely on borrowing to face contingencies, especially when credit limits vary and are uncertain. As reported by Zinman (2007) , credit cards are a relatively illiquid, costly, and risky payment device.
Co-holders thus keep liquid deposits for maintaining the option to draw down their savings when they need additional liquidity.
US data provides most of the empirical evidence supporting the theory of liquidity needs.
Telyukova (2013) estimates a variant of the model by Telyukova and Wright (2008) . Telyukova (2013) shows that much of households' co-holding behaviour is explained by liquidity needs, precisely by the amount and volatility of cash-only consumption, that is, the goods for which a credit card cannot be used. Similarly, Fulford (2015a) estimates his model using crosssectional data from the 2007 US SCF and proves that the variability of credit limits explains much of households' co-holding behaviour. Zinman (2007) also uses a dataset from the 2004 US SCF to evaluate the cost of co-holding debt and liquid savings. The author highlights that bank deposits and credit card debt are not perfect substitutes and shows that, after taking into account the implicit value of liquid assets, the cost of co-holding is irrelevant.
Do liquidity needs explain the co-holding behaviour of the poor living in developing countries? Most authors assume the validity of this argument (Morduch, 2010; Atkinson et al., 2013; Kast & Pomeranz, 2014 ) but hard evidence is missing. The common belief is that the poor co-hold debt and liquid savings for precautionary purposes. 4 When debt cannot be taken out flexibly, having a small savings cushion for emergencies can make a significant difference in alleviating the pressure of economic fluctuations.
Poor households behave differently than rich households. Microfinance shows that poor people in developing countries have extremely active financial lives, not in spite of, but because of 5 their poverty (Collins et al., 2009) . They permanently juggle between various sources of income, savings, loans, and reciprocal gifts (Garikipati et al., 2016a) . Compared with the rich, the poor are likely to be more credit constrained, and possibly more averse to risk and more exposed to it (Townsend, 1995) . However, given their budget constraints, they cannot afford to hold a large share of their wealth in unproductive liquid forms (Jalan & Ravallion, 2001) . Although both poor and wealthy people are subject to behavioural bias, errors in money management have a much stronger impact on the former than on the latter (Banerjee & Mullainathan, 2010 (Laureti & Hamp, 2011) . The data consist of financial transactions by 9,511 of SafeSave co-holders (59% of the total clients) on their savings-and-loan accounts for the period stretching from January 2004 to August 2012. SafeSave's accounts are especially well suited to the aim of this study because of their flexibility. Liquid savings can be freely used by borrowers to repay their debt and can be withdrawn (with no restrictions) in case of an emergency. Loan repayment is flexible as there are no fixed maturity and fixed repayment schedules. However, due to borrowing restrictions imposed by SafeSave-clients can take out a new loan only when the previous one has been fully repaid; and only one outstanding loan per household is allowed-loans are less liquid and, hence, less appropriate than savings for smoothing consumption in the face of income risk.
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This paper tests whether liquidity needs due to precautionary motives explain why the poor borrow at high interest rates and simultaneously hold low-yield liquid savings. To do this, I borrow from the banking literature on precautionary savings (for example, Carroll & Samwick, 1998) and 6 use income uncertainty to represent the co-holders' exposure to risk. I examine the impact of income uncertainty on the self-financing amount (SFA). The SFA is the amount of debt that can be repaid, or self-financed, with existing savings (Baland et al., 2011) . If the theory of liquidity needs is valid, co-holders facing higher income uncertainty should hold a higher SFA (Gathergood & Weber, 2014) .
I test the theory of liquidity needs using two different proxies for income uncertainty:
professional occupation and cash-in variability. My first proxy, occupation, is a typical proxy in the literature (Skinner, 1988; Jappelli & Pagano, 1994) . My second proxy, cash-in fluctuation, is unusual in the literature; I use it because of the richness of my dataset. Cash-in is the sum of loan repayments and savings deposits within a month. All else being equal, households with a regular income stream should be able to make regular payments into their account. This idea is guided by the following stylized facts. Working with low-income Bangladeshi households, Rutherford (2003) shows that poverty levels and the size of financial transactions, i.e. cash-in fluctuations, are closely linked. Ravi (2014) finds a similar relation using Indian data.
Results suggest that the theory of liquidity needs is rejected. I find a significant, negative impact of income uncertainty on the SFA. Co-holders with irregular jobs have on average a lower SFA than co-holders with regular jobs. Precisely, controlling for the size of transactions, estimates suggest that the SFA of individuals with irregular jobs is 158 Bangladeshi taka (BDT) lower than the SFA of those with regular jobs, against a sample mean of BDT 672. 6 I conducted a variety of robustness checks, and all estimates suggest that the SFA decreases with income uncertainty. The results seem to indicate that liquidity needs are not the reason why poor individuals hold liquid savings while simultaneously borrowing.
The paper discusses alternative explanations for co-holding. First, some co-holding is intrinsic in the process of loan repayment at SafeSave. Second, due to poor financial literacy SafeSave clients may not realize that co-holding is costly. Third, individuals attach specific objectives to 7 specific financial instruments because of mental accounting; for instance, savings balances might be earned for education, while debt is incurred for clothing (Bertaut et al., 2009) . Fourth, co-holding is a consequence of a lack of self-control (Atkinson et al., 2013; Morduch, 2010) . Finally, individuals co-hold to escape forced solidarity vis-à-vis family members and friends (Baland et al., 2011) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology.
Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes.
Methodology
This article focuses on co-holders and whether liquidity needs explain their co-holding behaviour.
The theory of liquidity needs highlights that liquid savings are valuable for precautionary purposes.
In contrast, borrowing for emergencies is risky, for example because banks impose credit limits that are both variable and uncertain. Since individuals co-hold to meet their liquidity needs, those subject to higher risk should show a firmer attitude toward co-holding. I test this prediction of the theory of liquidity needs by examining the impact of income uncertainty on the SFA. A positive impact would validate the theory of liquidity needs. This section describes the econometric model for estimating the impact of income uncertainty on the SFA.
I use pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and panel regression models. The pooled OLS model is written as:
where is the SFA of agent i at year t in branch b. The SFA measures the individual coholding attitude. In line with Baland et al. (2011) , I define as the outstanding loan that agent i is able to repay by withdrawing liquid savings. = 0R when agent i either has no liquid savings or no revolving debt at time t. A non-zero indicates that agent i co-holds revolving 8 debt and liquid savings at time t. Importantly, for measuring co-holding I am interested in two specific financial behaviours: the level of liquid savings, in other words, savings that can be withdrawn freely at any time without any constraints; and the level of revolving debt, which can be repaid freely at any time (Gathergood & Weber, 2014) .
The term _ represents income uncertainty of agent i at year t. The term represents a vector of agents' controls including, gender, age and length of time with SafeSave.
I control for income levels, because better-off individuals should be able to hold a higher SFA. As I do not observe co-holders' income, I use as proxy the average monthly cash-ins computed over oneyear periods. Lastly, the term represents yearly dummies, controls for branch fixed-effects, and is the error term distributed as a white noise,~(0, 2 ). To make the analysis more reliable, I use two different proxies for income uncertainty: professional occupation, which is fairly usual, and variability of cash-ins, which is original. Professional occupation is used to proxy income uncertainty by Skinner (1988) and Jappelli and Pagano (1994) , among others. It has the merit of relying on past objective information, and hence is not subject to the household's perception of risk.
Conversely, occupation can be subject to measurement errors and self-selection bias (Lusardi, 1997) . The next section discusses these issues in more details.
My second, and original, proxy for an agent's income uncertainty is the variability over time of monthly cash-ins. 7 Capturing this variable is made possible by the exceptional wealth of the SafeSave dataset. Cash-ins have not been used in the literature so far to proxy income uncertainty, probably because they are hardly observable to scholars. A monthly cash-in represents the portion of monthly income that the agent did not spend during the month. Arguably, the variability of cashins closely follows the variability of the income they depend on. Individuals who make regular, stable monthly payments to their financial accounts most likely earn a regular and stable income.
This intuition is supported by facts showing that cash-flows on microfinance accounts mimic the clients' income streams. Rutherford (2003, p. 65) reports that among Bangladeshi households "the 9 proportion of very small sums (under USD 10) is larger among the poor than among the other two groups [near poor and upper poor], and the proportion of very large sums (USD 100 plus) is much smaller". Ravi (2014) finds a link between repayment frequency and income frequency among Indian households, due to the fact that individuals with self-control problems repay their loans as soon as income is earned. In addition, evidence in the literature shows that short-term income shocks are the typical event (small loss, high probability) for which self-insurance through formal accounts is an effective alternative (Kast & Pomeranz, 2014) . All things equal, cash-in variability may reflect fluctuations in both income and expenditure. For example, cash-ins decline when a health emergency occurs. In this case, cash-in variability would be an even better proxy of the individuals' risk exposure, because it would reflect expenditure shocks (Fulford, 2015b) .
The main problem with the pooled OLS regression in Eq. (1) assume that risk aversion is time invariant. The FE panel regression model is written as:
where is the SFA of agent i in year t, is the vector of time-varying individual characteristics, that is, age, length of time with SafeSave, and cash-in size. I control for timeinvariant agents' heterogeneity through individual fixed-effects, . The idiosyncratic influence of the economy over different years is controlled for through year fixed-effects, . Lastly, is the error term.
Third, if risk aversion changes over time, the FE model in Eq. (2) suffers from an omitted variable bias. Is risk aversion likely to changes in my sample? The literature says that risk attitude has a clear (time-invariant) person-specific root (Cardenas & Carpenter, 2008) , but it is also timevarying due to changing socio-democratic characteristics, including age and wealth (Dohmen et al., 2011) . As I observe age, I run OLS and panel FE regressions interacting age with income uncertainty. Among the unobserved variable, wealth is less likely to change in my sample because I observe the great majority (75%) of borrowers for less than six years.
Finally, in models (1) and (2), there could be reverse causality between SFA and the monthly cash-ins. For example, savings may encourage individuals to engage in risky investments (Carvalho et al., 2016) ; this, in turn, increases cash-in variability. I can partly address reverse causality by regressing current SFA (in year ) with lagged cash-ins (in year + 1). In fact, it is unlikely that the current buffer stock affects past investment choices. Using lagged cash-ins is also coherent with the idea that individuals take one time-period to adjust their buffer stocks to uncertainty. Still, some caution is needed, as there might be a correlation between past and current cash-in values.
Dataset
In order to test whether the poor co-hold debt and liquid savings to meet liquidity needs, I use a unique database released by SafeSave. Established in 1996 as a financial co-operative by Stuart The unbalanced panel dataset contains 456,868 month-borrower observations relative to 9,511
SafeSave borrowers for the period from January 2004 to August 2012. The data come from four branches where product features were the same during the study period. 10 From 16,076 clients, we selected the 9,511 borrowers (59% of the sample). Importantly, all these borrowers are co-holders.
They are SafeSave clients who have taken out at least one loan during the study period. Co-holders hold debt and liquid savings simultaneously at least once. Because some co-holding of debt and liquid savings is natural during the repayment phase, all the borrowers at SafeSave are co-holders.
As I cannot distinguish clients who decide not to borrow from those who are barred from borrowing under SafeSave rules, I preferred to exclude non-borrowers from the analysis.
Daily financial transactions-movements in and out SafeSave accounts-include savings deposits, savings withdrawals, loans taken, and loan repayments. I aggregate daily financial transactions into monthly variables, and compute end-of-month outstanding loans and savings balances. In addition to financial variables, I observe the clients' characteristics, including age, gender, occupation, length of time with SafeSave, and slum area where they live. From the observed variables, I derive main variables of interests, including the SFA, occupational categories, and cash-in variability.
I observe only saving and borrowing on SafeSave accounts. Although the actual SFA should include overall liquid savings balances and revolving debt (Gathergood & Weber, 2014) , my contention is that SafeSave accounts accurately reflect the co-holding attitude in my sample, for two reasons. First, liquidity outside SafeSave should be insignificant or null. Liquidity includes cash at home and savings at the bank. Rutherford (2000; 2003) and Collins et al. (2009) claim that, among the poor, having more than one bank account is unusual. Likewise, storing cash at home is difficult "because such sums are easily eroded by many kinds of risk and pressure: they can be stolen or lost, or used up in trivial expenditure, or claimed by family and neighbours falling on hard times" (Rutherford, 2000, p. 11-12) . Bachas et al. (2016) provide evidence from Mexico that saving informally is difficult and using bank accounts to save helps solve self-control problems. As reported by Rutherford (2003) and Nasrin et al. (2016) , most slum dwellers in Dhaka do not hold bank accounts; and those who do rarely use them because "bank norms are so stiff that it is not convenient to use [them] regularly" (Rutherford, 2003, p. 51 (Ashraf et al., 2006; de Mel et al., 2013) .
Second, SafeSave clients may have other sources of loaned funds. However, these loans are either costless or inflexible, and hence not relevant for measuring co-holding. Formal loans from
MFIs come with a rigid repayment schedule and typically cannot be repaid prematurely if some liquidity is available (Labie et al., 2016) . Informal loans, such as loans from family and friends, and 13 goods taken on credit from shops, have low or zero interest charges; therefore, co-holding them with savings does not constitute a puzzle (Zinman, 2007) . Finally, loans from moneylenders are very costly but typically are repaid quickly; therefore, outstanding balances are irrelevant (Rutherford, 2003; Kislat, 2015) .
I classify co-holders into three occupational categories according to the level of income risk:
those with irregular jobs, those with regular jobs, and those with no occupation. 'Irregular' workers include the self-employed. They earn their income on a daily or weekly basis and often in irregular amounts. 'Irregular' workers are: transport labourers (for example rickshaw drivers), shop owners and shopkeepers, unskilled daily labourers (such as construction workers or brick breakers), handicraft workers, street traders, and other small business owners. 'Regular' workers have stable jobs and earn a regular, fixed wage, typically paid on a monthly basis. The vast majority (72%) of 'regular' workers are employed in garment factories; the rest are guards at schools or hotels, teachers, medical staff in hospitals, or home servants. 'No occupation' is a neutral category, not identifiable with a specific level of income risk. It includes mostly housewives (95%); the rest are students (4%), unemployed, and retired people. To test the theory of liquidity needs, I focus on the differences in the SFA between 'irregular' and 'regular' workers, as these two occupational categories have the biggest differences of income risk.
SafeSave collects data on its clients' occupations only at a single point in time, at the beginning of the business relationship. For my analysis, the lack of information on occupational changes is a limitation because it leaves no other choice than to assume that clients' occupations remain the same over the sample period. Still, two arguments can be raised in favour of the benign nature of this assumption. First, each individual in the sample is observed during a relatively short period of time, thus reducing the possible occurrences of occupational change. Even though the full observation period is nine years, the median co-holder is observed for no more than approximately four years. Only 5% of co-holders are observed for eight years or more. Second, mobility is very low across the broad occupational categories considered here (regular job, irregular job, no occupation). Low mobility is confirmed by the studies made by Mitra (2006) on slum dwellers in New Delhi and by Yamada (1996) in Peru. 
Regression results
This section presents the results of the estimations on the relationship between income uncertainty and the SFA. The theory of liquidity needs predicts a positive relationship between the two (Gathergood & Weber, 2014) , meaning that individuals facing high income uncertainty co-hold more than those facing low uncertainty. As income uncertainty is not observable, I use two alternative proxies: occupational categories and cash-in variability. Concerning these categories, the coefficient associated with the 'regular job' dummy measures the change in SFA compared to the 'irregular job' category (base category). If the theory of liquidity needs applies, the biggest variation should occur between these two occupational categories. The results are reported in Table 2 . In the pooled OLS regression (column (1)), the estimated coefficient of the 'regular job' dummy is positive and significant. Point estimates suggest that coholders with regular jobs hold, on average, BDT 158 more in SFA than co-holders with irregular jobs (against a sample mean value of BDT 672). Point estimates also suggest that the variability of cash-ins has a significant, negative effect on the SFA. This negative influence of income uncertainty on the SFA tends to reject the theory of liquidity needs.
One potential source of endogeneity is that the occupation variable may suffer from a selfselection bias, since people choose their job based on their degree of risk aversion (Lusardi, 1997) .
Hypothetically, more risk-averse individuals would choose regular jobs and also co-hold more in order to hedge against risk. In this situation, risk aversion would be an unobserved explicative variable, affecting both the SFA and occupations. I address this concern of endogeneity in three ways.
First, I introduce into the pooled OLS regression the interaction between occupational categories and cash-in variability; I then use this interaction term to check whether different occupational categories show a different response to uncertainty. The point estimates reported in column (2) of Table 2 show that cash-in variability has a negative and significant impact on the SFA, regardless of occupational category. Regular workers show a stronger response in absolute value: for a unit increase of uncertainty, regular workers reduce the SFA by BDT 102 more than irregular workers. These results confirm that the theory of liquidity needs is rejected.
Second, in the FE panel regression, individual fixed effects control for all (time-invariant) individual characteristics, including risk aversion. Importantly, I shall assume risk aversion is time invariant. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 Third, risk aversion may vary over time due to changing socio-demographic characteristics, including age and wealth (Dohmen et al., 2011) . So, I run OLS and FE regressions interacting age with income uncertainty; the results, reported in Table C2 in Appendix C, are robust. While I do not observe wealth, the possibility that individual wealth changes during the observation period is small. In fact I observe the great majority (75%) of co-holders for less than six years. This seems too short a timeframe for any significant change in individual wealth.
For robustness, I also estimate the impact of income uncertainty on two additional measures of co-holding. First, one could claim that what matters is not the SFA, but the cost of co-holding (Zinman, 2007; Gathergood & Weber, 2014 (Baland et al., 2011) . Being a relative term, the SF Ratio is not affected by the co-holders' income level. The estimated coefficients for the pooled OLS and FE panel regression are reported, respectively, in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 . The results are robust:
estimated coefficients suggest that income uncertainty has a negative and significant impact on the SF Ratio.
Multicollinearity is not expected to affect the results, as Pearson correlation coefficients, which measure simple correlation between pair of regressors, are all small in absolute value (≤0.22) (Farrar & Glauber, 1967) . To further assess multicollinearity, I compute the variance inflation factors (VIFs), which measure multiple correlations among regressors. In my data with VIF values between 1.02 and 1.08, multicollinearity should not be a concern-a general rule is that VIF values higher than 10 indicate harmful multicollinearity (0'Brien, 2007).
Various robustness checks are reported in Appendix C. Overall, coefficient estimates suggest that income uncertainty has a significant, negative impact on the amounts of debt and savings coheld by individuals. Equivalently, as income uncertainty augments, the cost of co-holding debt and savings decreases. The regression analysis performed in this session seems to indicate that liquidity needs do not explain the observed prevalence of co-holding in the data.
My results on the relationship between income uncertainty and co-holding show that the financial behaviour of poor people might be surprising and counter-intuitive. My results are in line with the findings of Jalan and Ravaillon (2001) , who document that one quarter of wealth in China is held in unproductive liquid forms. But only a small share of that wealth appears to be a precaution against income risk, and this is largely confined to middle-income groups. Probably the poor cannot afford to hold unproductive liquid assets for consumption smoothing. Instead, they prefer to use low-cost strategies for managing risk, such as informal credit from family and friends and reciprocity-based networks (Heltberg et al., 2015; Bouquet et al., 2015) .
Other authors (Prina, 2015; Kast & Pomeranz, 2014) show that the poor may value savings account for precautionary purposes. Precisely, formal savings accounts hedge risks that cannot be shared interpersonally, and thus complement pre-existing sharing arrangements (Dizon et al., 2015; Dupas et al., 2015) . Understanding which specific emergencies the poor use savings accounts for and when they use informal sharing arrangements is an interesting question for future research, although beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, in the remaining part of this section I give some clues to possible alternative explanations for co-holding behaviour in my sample.
Partly co-holding liquid savings and debt is intrinsic in the process of loan repayment at SafeSave. Because of the one-third compulsory savings rule, every loan repayment frees some savings that can be withdrawn to repay the loan. Since loan repayment is made in frequent small instalments, bringing the SFA to zero would imply substantial transaction costs. Another reason for co-holding can be poor financial literacy. Less financially literate individuals may not realize the existence of arbitrage opportunities and hence not recognize that co-holding is costly. Possibly, mental accounts could also play a role. The idea of mental accounting is that discipline and focus is achieved by attaching specific objectives to specific financial instruments, rather than treating the saving account as a place to accumulate funds for many uses (Bertaut et al., 2009) : savings balances might be earned for education, say, while debt is incurred for clothing.
The microfinance literature suggests two further explanations of co-holding behaviour. First, Morduch (2010) , Basu (2009) and Atkinson et al. (2013) view co-holding as a consequence of a lack of self-control. 12 Atkinson et al. (2013) show that poor households in Guatemala use the discipline of regular loan repayments to make deposits to their fully liquid savings accounts. Acting as a reminder and planning mechanism, the regular loan repayment schedule offers microfinance borrowers an incentive to accumulate savings. Morduch (2010) shows that households in need of liquidity may prefer to borrow, instead of withdrawing their own liquid savings. This is because, for individuals who lack self-control, the obligation to reimburse a third-party loan exerts more pressure to save (i.e., saving down) than restoring one's own liquid savings.
Second, the theory of escaping forced solidarity is based on the assumption that money requests from family members and friends are hard to refuse. According to this theory, individuals take costly loans to signal financial difficulties to their peers and their inability to financially support family and friends (Baland et al., 2011) . Salway et al. (2003 Salway et al. ( , 2005 highlight that siphoning off money for personal expenditure is much harder for those individuals who earn a steady income than for those receiving, for example, earnings that vary daily. As a consequence, individuals with regular jobs have a greater need to hide their income than individuals with irregular jobs. In our main regressions, the positive and significant impact of the "regular-job" dummy on the SFA seems to favour the explanation based on escaping forced solidarity. Further research on this issue could be interesting.
Conclusions
There is increasing evidence that the poor in developing countries value savings and do actually save. The poor need to save for different purposes. Our sample is composed of microfinance borrowers, most of whom also feel the need to save. This paper tests whether liquidity needs explain why microfinance clients hold liquid savings and debt simultaneously. In contrast to the 20 evidence on developed countries, where rich people co-hold debt and savings for liquidity needs, our key finding is that liquidity needs do not explain the same behavioural anomaly for the poor in the subject of various studies in microfinance (e.g. Rutherford, 2000 Rutherford, , 2011 Dehejia et al., 2012) .
In real life, poor people borrow and save simultaneously. Why do they co-hold debt and liquid savings? Do they do so to protect themselves against the risk of forced solidarity (Baland et al., 2011) rather than to cope with income and expenditure shocks? Another question is whether flexible savings-and-loan accounts are the right product for co-holders. The main drawback of coholding loans and savings is the interest rate spread that has to be paid for this strategy. For example, the interest rate spread between savings and borrowing at SafeSave is 24% on a yearly basis. Because co-holding loans and savings significantly reduces the probability of default, one could imagine a decreasing interest rate mechanism for loans backed by savings. Interestingly, SafeSave has piloted the P9 product in one of its branches. This savings-and-loan product provides liquidity through a cheap credit line while, at the same time, helping SafeSave's clients to accumulate savings (Rutherford, 2011 Laibson et al. (2003) explain a different puzzle: why households in the US make long-term pension savings and simultaneously borrow at high cost through credit cards. This choice is attributed to the agents' lack of self-control (Laibson, 1997; O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999) . 4 The microfinance literature disregards the transaction motive because micro-savings accounts typically cannot be used as a payment instrument.
5 Loans could be the most effective means to hedge against forced solidarity risk (Baland et al., 2011) .
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6 The exchange rate was roughly BDT 70 to USD 1 during the study period. The wage of a domestic worker in Dhaka is BDT 770 a month.
7 Monthly cash-ins add up all savings deposits and loan repayments that the agent makes during the month, net of variations in other assets and liabilities. Technically, the proxy for income uncertainty is a normalized measure of cash-in variability, the coefficient of variation, which is the standard deviation divided by the mean. Not being influenced by cash-in size, the coefficient of variation is preferable to the standard deviation when comparing uncertainty among individuals (Bedeian & Mossholder, 2000; Wei et al., 2016) . Imagine two individuals who have average monthly cash-ins of BDT 10 and BDT 100, respectively, and the standard deviation is BDT 10 for both agents. All things being equal, the same value of the standard deviation has a stronger effect on the individual with a lower cash-in than one with a higher cash-in. This section describes the mathematical computation of the SFA.
Let S it be the amount of savings and B it the outstanding debt of agent i at time t. Since SafeSave obliges clients to hold compulsory savings equal to 0.33 (or one-third) of their debt, the amount of liquid savings, , is:
where the term 0.33 represents the compulsory portion of savings. The amount of liquid savings is the portion of total savings that exceeds this compulsory part, and can be withdrawn freely without restrictions. Accordingly, the SFA of agent i at time t is given by:
According to Eq. (A2), when the savings balance is equal to or higher than the debt balance, co-holders can repay the debt entirely with their savings. Hence, the SFA is equal to the outstanding debt. In contrast, when the savings balance is lower than the debt balance, co-holders can partially repay the debt with their savings. Precisely, the SFA is given by 1.5 times the liquid savings.
Imagine that is used to repay the debt. The equivalent reduction of debt, equal to , implies a reduction in compulsory savings and an additional liquidity input, amounting to 0.33 . Recursive substitutions yield:
(1 + 0.33 + 0.33 2 + 0.33 3 + ⋯ ) = 1.5 . Table B1 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients among the regressors. Here, high correlation is bad news. Precisely, multicollinearity describes the situation when two or more predictors in the regression are highly correlated. In my dataset, the Pearson correlation coefficients across regressors are rather small in absolute value (≤0.22), hence multicollinearity should not be a concern (Farrar & Glauber, 1967) .
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B. Correlation among regressors
t-tests for equal means across occupational categories (Table B2) show that cash-in size and cash-in variability are significantly different. As expected, irregular workers have lower cash-in size and higher cash-in variability than regular workers. 
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C. Robustness Checks
This section includes several robustness checks, which were performed to estimate the relation between income uncertainty and the SFA. The estimates in all these regressions are consistent with the main results: regular workers hold on average more SFA than irregular workers; the impact of income uncertainty on SFA is negative and significant, on average.
First, I run (pooled OLS and FE panel) regressions by occupational categories (Table C1) .
Second, I run regressions where age is interacted with income uncertainty, so as to control for timevarying risk attitude due to age (Table C2 ). Third, I run regressions where uncertainty is proxied by the standard deviation of cash-ins. The effect of the size of cash-ins is taken into account by including the average cash-in among the regressors (Table C3) . Finally, I estimate several betweeneffect (BE) panel regressions (Table C4) . BE regression models are used to estimate the coefficients of time-invariant regressors, while also exploiting the panel nature of the dataset. BE regression attributes one observation for each characteristic to each individual, given by his/her mean value across time (Frondel and Vance, 2010) . Precisely, the average SFA of individual i is explained by his/her income uncertainty, gender, mean age, mean length of time with SafeSave, mean cash-ins, and so on. The results of BE regressions are consistent with the results of pooled OLS and FE models. 
